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CONTRADICTORY GOVERNMENT
ACTION: ESTOPPEL OF
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
By PATRICK

MCDONALD*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Kenneth Culp Davis notes the privileged position of the state in relation
to a basic principle of justice:
Although the courts have developed a doctrine of equitable estoppel, under which
one who makes a representation to another who reasonably relies to his detriment is estopped to deny the truth of the representation or to gain by taking a
position inconsistent with the representation, the courts built up a large body of
law that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to the government .... 1

In Canada, this special immunity is often considered one of the mysterious
attributes of the Crown. It is said that "the King is not bound by estoppels,
though he can take advantage of them." 2
The result is often apparent injustice. In Gibbon v. The Queen, for
example, a taxpayer was erroneously allowed certain deductions for two
successive years.3 Had he known that the deductions were not allowable, he
might have availed himself of other legitimate deductions under the Income
Tax Act. That circumstance was held to create no estoppel preventing the
Minister of National Revenue from reassessing the taxpayer on the basis of
the higher tax that ought to have been paid. We can hope to find something
more to commend that result than the bare affirmation that the Crown cannot
be estopped.
There are cases in which the courts have resisted inconsistency in the
conduct of government business. In some of these, the courts find some basis
other than estoppel to achieve that result. In others, and in the decisions of
Lord Denning in particular, the application of estoppel against the Crown is
expressly acknowledged. These latter cases have been accounted for as "exceptions of indeterminate scope" 4 or as evidence simply of a conflict in the
authorities. 5
© Copyright, 1979, Patrick McDonald.
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lAdministrative Law (3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1972) at 343.
2
R. v. Royal Bank of Can. (1920), 50 D.L.R. 293 at 304, [1920] 1 W.W.R. 198 at
209 (Man. C.A.), quoting from Everest and Strode, Law of Estoppel (3d ed. London:
Stevens, 1923).
3 (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 733, 77 D.T.C. 5193, [1977] C.T.C. 333 (F.C.T.D.).
4
De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (3d ed. London: Stevens,
1973) at 90.
5 E.g., Gillies Bros. v. The King, [1947) Ex. C.R. 210, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 769.
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I think that something more satisfactory can be said. It requires, however, a restatement of the basic premise. The rule is simply that estoppel
cannot be used to defeat the operation of legislation. Whatever freedom the
government enjoys to contradict itself may be considered a product of the
very principle that limits the freedom of executive action. That principle is
the subordination of executive to legislative authority. Where legislation is not
involved, the Crown as a legal person is subject to the principle of estoppel. 6
II. AUTHORITATIVE POWERS OF DECISION
The key to understanding the scope for estoppel in the context of legislation lies in a distinction that is sometimes used to explain the basic nature
of the administrative process. 7 Statutes create rights and obligations in two
different ways. The statute may speak for itself, and define in absolute terms
what shall or shall not be done, or what shall be the legal consequence of
particular conduct.8 Or the statute may define rights and obligations in terms
of the determinations of government officials. In the second instance, legal
relations are fixed by the determinations of the official. He enjoys what may
be called an authoritative power of decision. Mr. Justice Rand, dealing with
another sort of problem altogether, has expressed the point by saying that
sometimes the award or adjudication of an official is a "constituent element"
in the rights created by legislation. 9
No estoppel can arise out of the acts of an official who enjoys no authoritative power of decision in relation to the rights and obligations in question.
Why should this be so? The answer is the supremacy of legislation. Ex hypothesi, legal relations arising from legislation are independent of official
action. Consequently, nothing can be made to hinge on the conduct of officials without disturbing the legal consequences called for by the statute. It
really has nothing to do with any privileged position of the Crown.
0

In 1907 three judges of the Supreme Court of Canada said that estoppel could not
be invoked against the Crown in a case involving forged cheques drawn on an account
of the Government of Canada: The Bank of Montreal v. The King (1907), 38 S.C.R.
258 per Davies, Idington and Duff JI. The weight of modern authority is, however, to the
contrary: Queen Victoria Niagara Falls Park Comm'rs v. International Ry. Co. (192829), 63 O.L.R. 49 (C.A.); A.G. to the Prince of Wales v. Collom, [1916] 2 K.B. 193 at
204. See also Farrer, A Prerogative Fallacy - "That the Crown is not Bound by
Estoppel" (1933), 49 L.Q.R. 511. In Robertson v. Min. of Pensions, [1949] K.B. 227
at 231, 11948] 2 All E.R. 767 at 770, Lord Denning said that the notion of Crown immunity from estoppel has long since been exploded. In St. Ann's Island Shooting and
Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, [1950] S.C.R. 211, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 225, Rand J. said
that the Crown could not be estopped from challenging a lease. This was not because
the Crown was immune but because "there can be no estoppel in the face of an express
provision of a statute" (at 232). Most of the cases in which it is said that the Crown
cannot be estopped involve the Crown in its capacity as a statutory authority and hence
the subordination of executive action to the terms of legislation.
7 See Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United
States (New York: Russell & Russell, 1959), chap. 1.
8 It is then for the courts to resolve disputes arising under the legislation.
9 A. E. Dupont v. Inglis, [1958] S.C.R. 535, involving section 96 of the British
North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (as amended) (U.K.).
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The clearest sort of case arises where the government official has no
power of decision at all. In Millet v. The Queen, the plaintiff's husband
entered into a contract of insurance with the Crown under the Veterans'
Insurance Act. 10 Regulations under the Act provided that the policy should
be void in the event of late payment of premiums. The husband made two
late payments and these were accepted by agents of the Crown administering
the Act. The last payment before his death was also late, and the Crown
relied on this to avoid the policy. The Exchequer Court held that the Crown
could not be estopped by the actions of its officials from insisting on strict
compliance with regulations enacted pursuant to statute." In a similar case,
regulations provided that supplementary death benefits should not be payable
to any government employee who elected in prescribed form not to be included in the plan. Although payroll personnel had made salary deductions
for an employee who had made
the election, the Crown was not estopped
12
from invoking the regulations.
The officials who received premiums and made salary deductions were
not authorized to determine whether the conditions precedent to insurance
and death benefit payments, respectively, had been satisfied. Accordingly,
rights were not affected by their actions. To estop the Crown would be to
treat the regulations as if they had not been enacted. It is for that reason,
and not because the Crown occupies some special position, that estoppel
could not operate.' 3 Where a private person acts as though the conditions
precedent to some statutory right have been satisfied, he is not estopped from
invoking the provisions of the statute to deny that the right exists. 1 4 The
Municipal Council of Peterborough and Victoria v. Grand Trunk Railway is
an example. 15 Legislation provided for repayment in shares of loans made by
any shareholder for the preliminary expenses of a railway company. The
plaintiff municipality made advances to the company, but took no shares. It
sought repayment and said that the defendant railway was estopped from
saying that the statutory provisions for repayment had not been satisfied.
10 [1954] Ex. C.R. 562.

11 Fournier I. said, id. at 572: "In my view, where a particular obligation or duty
is imposed by statute or by regulations validly made thereunder and embodied in a
contract no estoppel should be allowed to give relief from the said obligation."
12 Gamble v. The Queen, [1960] Ex. C.R. 138.
13 See also A.G. Can. v. C. C. Fields & Co., [1943] O.R. 120, [1943] 2 D.T.C. 622,
[1943] C.T.C. 222 (H.C.); CPR v. The King, [1931] A.C. 414, [1931] All E.R. Rep.
113, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 386 (P.C.); City of Toronto v. Toronto Ry. Co. (1918), 46 D.L.R.
435 (Ont. C.A.). In this last case, the railway and the city entered into a contract purporting to implement their respective obligations under statute. The railway complied
with the agreement, but the city asserted that the agreement did not properly reflect the
obligations of the railway under the statute and commenced an action based on the
terms of the legfslation. The Court said (at 443): "Of course nothing in the way of
estoppel can be claimed against the city-it cannot legally violate a statute, or give
permission to violate a statute: any contract purporting to give such permission is merely
void and does not create an estoppel."
14
Bower, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation, ed. Turner (2d ed.
London: Butterworths, 1966) at 131-34.
15 (1859), 18 U.C.Q.B. 220.
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The court said simply that "the doctrine of estoppel can never interfere with
the proper carrying out of the provision of acts of parliament." 16
The situation appears to be different where the conduct relied on is that
of a government official exercising some decision-making power under the
statute. In such a case, he is not in the same position as a private person. His
decisions are not extraneous to the statutory rights and obligations that are
to be implemented. Yet the question remains whether the legal consequences
in question are fixed entirely by his determinations. He may exercise a statutory power of decision that is not authoritative because it does not exhaust
the operative effect of the statute.
This was the situation in City of Halifax v. Wonnacott.17 The defendant
property owner applied for and obtained from the City's building inspector
a permit to carry out repairs to a garage. The repairs as executed made the
garage a commercial use of the property. The City commenced proceedings
for removal of the building on the ground, inter alia, that section 815 of the
City Charterexpressly prohibited the use of land in a residential district for
commercial purposes. The defendant argued that issuance of the permit created
an estoppel. However, issuance of the permit could not rob section 815 of its
independent effect. The statute certainly required official approval of construction, but it required something else as well, namely, that commercial
developments not be constructed in residential districts. Because section 815
was expressed in absolute terms and not merely as a condition governing
the issuance of permits, the action of the building inspector was not an
authoritative determination that the provisions of the statute had been satisfied. The same reasoning was applied in Cam Gard Supply Ltd. v. MNR.18
The Income Tax Act provides for a deduction from income of payments
made for a particular purpose to a pension fund, where the payment is
approved by the Minister. The Minister approved a payment, but the taxpayer
was subsequently reassessed and the deduction disallowed. Addressing .the
argument that the Minister's approval could not be withdrawn, Thurlow .1.
said:
Where a statutory requirement for the deduction has not been met, the deduction
for that reason must be disallowed and it does not matter that the approval of
the payment, which is another of the essential conditions of deductibility, had
been given.19

In other words, the approval of the Minister was not the means chosen by

16ld. at 224. Maritime Electric Co. v. General Dairies,Ltd., [1937] A.C. 610, a
decision of the Privy Council on a Canadian appeal, illustrates the same point. The
Public Utilities Act of New Brunswick provided that public utility companies were to
receive the rates specified in schedules to the.Act, nothing more and nothing less. A
consumer who had mistakenly been charged less than the specified amounts argued that
the utility company was estoppel from claiming more. The Privy Council said that
estoppel cannot avail "to release the plaintiff from an obligation to obey such a statute,
nor can it enable the defendant to escape from a statutory obligation of such kind on

his part" (at 620).
17 [1951] 2 D.L.R. 488 (N.S.S.C.).
18 [1974] 2 F.C. 236, 74 D.T.C. 6429, [1974] C.T.C. 487.
19 Id.at 240 (F.C.).
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the legislature for determining whether the essential conditions of deductibility had been met. It was merely an added requirement. 20
Statutory powers that are essentially of a police or enforcement nature
often appear to give to the official the power to determine what is required
by legislation. Under the Income Tax Act,-2 for example, the Minister is
required to assess the tax for the taxation year and the interest and penalties,
if any, payable. But the taxpayer's duty is to pay the amount prescribed by
the statute, and not merely to pay the amount assessed by the Minister. The
provisions for filing of returns and for review and assessment by the Minister
constitute the process for enforcement of the obligation to pay. If there were
any doubt on the matter, it is dispelled by section 152(3), which provides:
Liability for the tax under this Part [Part I - Income Tax] is not affected by an

incorrect or incomplete assessment or by the fact that no assessment has been
made.

Liability is independent of the administrative process of enforcement. Consequently, the duty to pay tax cannot be affected by the determinations of the
Minister or his subordinates. In Woon v. MNR, the taxpayer received an

"unequivocal ruling" from the Commissioner of Income Tax that tax would
not be payable on a particular scheme of property distribution. 22 This could
not work any estoppel against the Commissioner or Minister in the face of a
statutory provision requiring the distributed property to be included in income
as dividends:

Parliament has said that under certain circumstances certain things are deemed to
be dividends and manifestly the Commissioner of Taxation had no power to declare otherwise or to settle the limit of taxation thereunder, other than according
to the statute itself.
[The ruling] cannot be invoked by the appellant as a ground for raising estoppel
in this case, as to do so would be to nullify the requirement of the statute itself.28

The essential point is that the Commissioner had no authoritative power of
decision affecting the obligation to pay tax.24 Not even an assessment by the
20

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in MNR v. Inland Indus. Ltd.
(1971), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 677, is to the same effect. The Minister had approved and
registered a pension plan, and it was argued that he could not impose any assessment
that did not allow deduction of contributions to the plan. Pigeon J. said (at 682):
"Mhe Minister cannot be bound by an approval given when the conditions prescribed
by the law were not met"
21 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
22 [1951] Ex. C.R. 18, 50 D.T.C. 871, [1950] C.T.C. 263.
23 Id. at 25-27 (Ex. C.R.).
24 There are other cases in which taxpayers have been prejudiced by the incorrect
advice of taxing officials: Gauthier v. MNR (1977), 78 D.T.C. 1126 (T.R.B.); South
Sask. Motors Ltd. v. Min. of Fin. of Sask., [1977] 5 W.W.R. 727 (Sask. Q.B.). In some
of the income tax cases, the Court relies on the discredited notion that estoppel simply
does not apply against the Crown: e.g., Western Vinegars Ltd. v. MNR, [1938] 2 D.L.R.
503 (Ex. Ct.). In Stickel v. MNR (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 721, 72 D.T.C. 6178, [1972]
C.T.C. 211, the Federal Court, Trial Division held that the Minister's duty to assess in
accordance with the Act could not be affected by the terms of an Information Bulletin
because "estoppel is subject to the one general rule that it cannot override the law of
the land" (at 732). However, where the government advice relied on can be construed
as a statement of fact, there is authority for saying that estoppel can operate to prevent
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Minister affects that obligation. Thus, as in Gibbon v. The Queen, the Minister cannot be estopped from reassessing a taxpayer who has been permitted
to make deductions of amounts that do not qualify under the Act. 2 5
It is not anything peculiar to income tax legislation that renders estoppel
inappropriate. If a government official has the power only to enforce a statutory requirement or prohibition, he cannot preclude himself from exercising
that power by any representation as to what is required or prohibited. In
Dickson v. Stevens, the collector of customs was alleged to have given the
plaintiff permission to remove certain goods from his vessel without filing a
report. 26 The Customs Act prohibited the removal of goods before filing a
report and authorized the collector to seize any vessel from which goods
might have been unlawfully removed. The Supreme Court of New Brunswick
held that, if the collector had given permission for the removal, he had no
authority to do so and the permission could not affect the validity of the
27
subsequent seizure.
It is misleading to express the result of these cases by saying that estoppel
cannot interfere with the performance of a statutory duty. The same result obtains where there is no duty to act, but merely a discretionary power.
In Southend-on-Sea Corp. v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd., the question arose
whether a public authority could be estopped from exercising its discretionary
power to issue an enforcement notice.28 It was argued that, since the authority
was not obliged to issue a notice in any event, it could be estopped by a prior
determination that was not made in exercise of any authoritative power of
decision. Lord Parker refused to distinguish between a statutory duty and a
statutory discretion.
After all, in a case of discretion there is a duty under the statute to exercise a
free and unhindered discretion ....
[A]n estoppel cannot be raised to prevent or
hinder the exercise of the discretion.2 9

The point is that the legislature intends the discretion to be exercised on the
basis of a proper understanding of what the statute requires. If an official is
held to a decision that mistakes
that understanding, he is precluded from any
0
exercise of the discretion8

officials from taking a position contrary to that advice. See The Queen v. Langille
(1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 124, 77 D.T.C. 5086, [1977] C.T.C. 144 (F.C.T.D.) and
Gibbonv. The Queen, supra note 3, at 738 (D.L.R.).
25
Supra note 3. See also Cohen v. The Queen (1978), 78 D.T.C. 6099 (F.C.T.D.).
20 (1889), 31 N.B.R. 611.
27
De Smith, supra note 4, at 89, summarizes the results of a group of similar
English cases as follows: "Purported authorization, waiver, acquiescence and delay do
not preclude a public body from reasserting its legal rights or powers against another
party if it has no power to sanction the conduct in question or to endow that party with
the legal right or immunity that he claims."
28 [1961] 2 All E.R. 46.
20 Id. at 48-49.
s0 Lord Parker C.J. said that the authority would be prevented from exercising its
statutory discretion "if by reason of estoppel it is prevented from proving and showing
that it is a valid enforcement notice in that amongst other things planning permission
was required." Id. at 49.
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Where the conduct or representation relied on is that of an official having authoritative power to determine what the legislation requires, it can
hardly be said that estoppel would defeat the operation of the statute. When
estoppel is raised, the official cannot point to the statute and say that it
provides in some absolute way for certain rights and obligations that must
be recognized and enforced.3 1 Rights are not provided for save as determined
by the official, and it is upon his determinations that reliance is placed. The
individual does not rely on official conduct to contradict the law, rather, he
invokes official conduct as an expression of the law. There is no reason,
therefore, why the government should not be estopped.
In Lever (Finance)Ltd. v. Westminster Corp., developers obtained an
injunction restraining the planning authority from requiring demolition of a
house.32 The authority said that there had been a material variation in the
construction of the house and that the necessary planning permission in respect of that variation had not been obtained. The developers said that they
had received the assurance of the authority's planning officer that the permission of the authority was not required because the variation was not
material. It is clear that the operation of the statute would be defeated if a
"material variation" in construction not having the approval of the planning
authority were sanctioned in the name of estoppel. Lord Denning, however,
identified the weakness in this analysis when he asked: "who is to decide
whether a variation is material or not?"33 If it is the planning authority, then
nothing more is required by the legislation than a determination by it that
the variation is immaterial. That had been done by the planning officer. This
left only the question whether the representations of the officer bound the
authority and whether the authority should be permitted, in effect, to change
its mind. The officer's representations were binding because it had been the
practice of the planning authority to allow its officers to advise applicants in
respect of variations. The authority could not change its mind because the
developers had acted on the representation by proceeding with construction.
There might have been some question in the Lever case whether the
planning body had any authoritative power to decide that the variation in
construction was not material. This did not become an issue, however, because it had been part of the argument of the defendant corporation that
Parliament had conferred upon it the power to determine not only whether
planning permission should be granted, but also whether it was necessary at
all.3 4
It is remarkable that in this case Lord Denning appeared to persist in a
31

The public official can only say that his understanding of what the legislation
requires has changed. Whether he should be free to change his mind is the question
dealt with in the next section of this paper. Of course, he may also say that the conduct
or representation relied on was an excess of jurisdiction and in that sense that his earlier
decision contradicts the statute. The problem of reliance on ultra vires acts is also dealt
with infra.
82 [1971] 1 Q.B. 220, [1970] 3 All E.R. 496.
33
Id.at 230 (Q.B.), 500 (All E.R.).
3
4 See Evans, Delegation and Estoppel in Administrative Law (1971), 34 Mod. L.
Rev. 335 at 336.
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view that had been the object of criticism in the House of Lords. In an earlier
case involving facts similar to those in Lever, the Master of the Rolls had
decided that an activity subject to licensing is not to be treated as illegal if a
government official gives his assurance that no licence is required. 35 The House
of Lords dismissed the appeal but disagreed with the reasoning in the Court
below. Lord Normand said:
[Mt is certain that neither a minister nor any subordinate officer of the Crown
can by any conduct or representation bar the Crown from enforcing a statutory
prohibition or from prosecuting for its breach 2 0

In light of this, the judgment in Lever certainly appears recalcitrant. But Lord
Denning's insight shows that there may be no statutory prohibition to be
enforced if a public authority, with an authoritative power of decision in that
respect, has determined that no licence is required.
The same perception that prevailed in Lever was applied in an earlier
decision of the Court of Appeal. North Western Gas Board v. Manchester
Corp. involved the power of local authorities to levy rates for municipal
purposes on the basis of the assessed value of real property.37 The basis of
assessment in respect of premises occupied by any gas board was altered by
retroactive legislation. As part of certain transitional provisions, the legislation directed that the local authority should collect from any gas board the
amount by which a specified figure exceeded "the total amount of rates
actually levied on the board" by the rating authority for the transitional
period. During that period, certain amounts had been paid by the board to
the local authority, and these amounts were designated in the accounts of
the authority as "rates." The board claimed that these amounts should be
taken into account in determining its liability under the transitional provisions, but the local authority denied that they were "rates actually levied on
the board." This was something the authority could not be heard to say.
Sellers L.J. spoke for a majority of the judges on this point:
It does not seem to me that the estoppel raised by the board seeks to prevent or
hinder the proper performance by the corporation of their statutory duty. All
that is being said is that they cannot be heard to say that the nature of the payments they received was not that of rates levied on the board when they are
carrying out the statutory duty which [the Act] imposes on them. 88

The local authority had determined that the amounts received by it were rates
and the Court felt that the legislation required nothing more than that determination for the purposes of the particular duty to collect any deficiency.

M.

DISCRETIONARY POWERS AND BINDING DETERMINATIONS

It is only authoritative powers of decision that may be constrained by
any prior representation, in words or conduct. The official exercising such a
power must be free to do what the statute requires, but the statute does not
require any particular result. Instead, it requires a decision by the official.
35

36

Falmouth Boat Constr. Ltd. v. Howell, [1950] 1 All E.R. 538.
Howell v. Falmouth Boat Constr. Ltd., [1951] A.C. 837, [1951] 2 All E.R. 278.

87 [1963] 3 All E.R. 442.
38 Id. at 451.
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If the earlier representation is taken to embody such a decision, the operation
of the statute is not defeated by requiring the official to act in accordance
with his representation. 89 There is a problem, however, in the circumstance
that the official might properly act otherwise were it not for the representation. Can his freedom of action be taken away by a representation?
Estoppel assumes importance only where the government proposes to do
what it has power to do. Judicial review for excess of jurisdiction is adequate
protection against any other sort of proposed action. Consequently, if it is to
be effective at all, estoppel must have the effect of depriving a public authority of power it would otherwise enjoy. Yet it has always been said that a
public authority cannot be estopped from exercising its statutory power or
discretion. Even Lord Denning, who said the notion of Crown immunity from
estoppel has long since been exploded, acknowledged the rule.40 If this means
that the authority must be free to do what it has power to do, it would seem
that the government cannot be bound by its undertakings. The rule has been
given that meaning, for de Smith says that the ambit of a public authority's
powers cannot be abridged by its own conduct. 4 '
I think the true position is otherwise, and may be expressed as follows.
In respect of any authoritative power of decision, a public authority is bound
by its undertakings but it cannot be estopped from exercising its power. What
must be shown, of course, is that the exception does not swallow the rule.
When it is said that a public authority cannot be estopped from exercising its powers, reference is usually made to the leading decision of the House
of Lords in Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald.42 During expropriation proceedings, the Harbour Trustees resolved to limit their use of the property to
a use that would not interfere with the owner's access to it from adjoining
property. The issue arose whether compensation for the property should be
assessed on a basis consistent with that restriction. The House of Lords held
that it should not, because the resolution of the Harbour Trustees was invalid.
The Trustees enjoyed a discretionary power to construct such works as they
39 This is not recognized in a recent decision of the Federal Court, Trial Division.
In Gill v. The Queen (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 341, two aliens were required to give
security deposits by an immigration officer pursuant to section 63 of the Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, to guarantee their departure from Canada by a stipulated date.
The section provides that if an alien fails to leave Canada within the time prescribed,
the immigration officer in charge "may order that the sum of money so deposited be
forfeited." The aliens relied on representations that their deposits would not be forfeited
while their application for landed immigrant status was being processed. The deposits
were, however, forfeited. Cattanach I. held that the doctrine of estoppel could not be
invoked against the Crown. He also said: "It is not open to the plaintiff to set up an
estoppel to prevent the operation of the statute nor can representations made by departmental officers preclude the operation of the statute" (at 345). I do not see how the
operation of the statute would have been defeated since the statute did not require
forfeiture; it authorized the immigration officer to make an order of forfeiture, and in
exercise of that authority the officer had decided that forfeiture was not appropriate
in particular circumstances.
40 Wells v. Min. of Hous. and Local Gov't, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1041 at 1044.
41
Supra note 4, at 90.
42 (1883), 8 A.C.623 (H.L.).
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thought fit for the benefit of the harbour. If effect were given to their gratuitous undertaking, it would prevent the Trustees from exercising that power.
Consequently, the Trustees were incompetent to bind themselves in that manner. Lord Watson addressed the argument that the power of the Trustees was
permissive only so that they might properly decide not to exercise it in any
particular way. This, he said, would affirm a power in the
Trustees to repeal
43
the provisions of the statute which conferred the power.
The House of Lords decision was applied by the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Dominion of Canada Postage Stamp Vending Co.44 The
Postmaster General had exercised his statutory power to grant licences to
agents for the sale of postage stamps. The licensing instrument, in the form
of an agreement, provided that the licence should not be revocable. The
Court held nonetheless that the licence was revocable at the discretion of the
Postmaster General. Having found that the power to grant licences carried
with it as a necessary incident the power of revocation, Lamont J. went on
to say:
A Minister cannot, by agreement, deprive himself of a power which is committed to him to be exercised from time to time as occasion may require in the
public interest, or validly covenant to refrain from the use of that power when
it may be requisite, or expedient in his discretion, upon grounds of public policy,
to execute it .... 45

In each of these cases, the undertaking given was, in effect, an undertaking not to exercise the statutory power at all. The power of decision was
one the legislature intended to be exercised from time to time as occasion and
circumstances might seem to warrant. The Harbour Trustees and the Postmaster General said that a particular course of action would not be taken
whatever the circumstances.
These, then, were promises not to exercise the
46
power of decision.

What amounts to substantially the same thing is a promise to exercise
the discretionary power in a particular way, when that promise is made outside the perspective within which the statute is intended to operate. In
Vancouver v. Registrar Vancouver Land RegistrationDistrict,developers and
the City entered into a contract by which the City undertook to rezone
property in consideration of the developers' covenants restricting their use of
the property. 47 The agreement was unenforceable because the discretionary
power to amend the zoning by-law was intended by the legislature to be ex43

Id. at 639-40.

[1930] S.C.R. 500, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 241. It was also applied by the Court in CPR v.
The King, [1930] S.C.R. 574, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 161, to meet the argument that the railway
had by the acquiescence of government officers acquired the right to use Crown land in
perpetuity [at 180-81 (D.L.R.)].
45 Id. at 244 (D.L.R.).
46 Two judges of the Supreme Court of Canada followed the Ayr Harbour Trustees
case on this point in Town of Cobalt v. Temiskaming Telephone Co. (1919), 59 S.C.R.
62. Mr. Justice Anglin (with whom Mignault 1. agreed) held that the town could not
have granted an indefinite licence to the company because by doing so it would preclude
itself from granting to any other company an exclusive licence, as it had the power to
do "from time to time."
47 [1955] 2 D.L.R. 709 (B.C.C.A.).
44
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ercised after a public hearing had been held and all the relevant considerations weighed. The City had promised, in effect, to disregard any objections
to the rezoning that might be forthcoming at the public hearing. No promise
could be made at a time when factors intended to influence the discretion
could not be known. In Western Dominion Coal Mines Ltd. v. The King, Mr.

Justice Rand invoked the same principle to defeat the company's claim for
a subsidy.48 The company said that the Emergency Coal Production Board
had induced it to believe that a subsidy would be paid. Rand J. noted that,
whatever assurances might have been given, the Board could not at that time
have determined whether the company qualified under the terms of the applicable Order in Council. He said:
[The subsidy] involved the discretion of the Board which could be exercised only
after operating results became known and on an appreciation of all circumstances: a discretion which became executed only when the subsidy was in fact
paid. 49

In the case of powers of adjudication, the merits of the individual case
are among the factors intended by the legislature to influence the discretion.
This, of course, is reflected in the principle that a public authority cannot
found its decision on a preconceived rule or policy formulation without reference to the exigencies of the particular case. 0 And it means also that the
individual cannot hope to find a binding promise in what has been said or
done by the public authority in other proceedings or in announcements of
policy not associated with any particular case. In fixing rates for gas under
The Public Utilities Board Act, the Manitoba Public Utilities Board is not
bound by its interpretation of the phrase "in the public interest" made in the
context of a prior case involving different circumstances.r 1 Similarly, it has
been held that the Ontario Labour Relations Board is not bound by its findings of fact made upon evidence in other proceedings. 2 So too, the City of
Toronto is free to prosecute an individual for violation of its zoning by-law

48

[1947] S.C.R. 313, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 433.

49 Id. at 452 (D.L.R.). Similar reasoning prevailed in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite

v. The King, [1921] 3 K.B. 500. The British Government had agreed, in wartime, that
a Swedish ship would not be detained in port if the ship arrived with an "approved
cargo." On a petition of right for damages for beach of the undertaking, Rowlatt I. said
that "it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which
must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises"
(at 503; emphasis added). In argument, counsel for the Crown had said that clearance
to leave an English port would have to depend upon the military exigencies at the time
that it is applied for.
50 The principle is carefully analyzed and explained by Molot, The Self-Created
Rule of Policy and Other Ways of Exercising Administrative Discretion (1972), 18
McGill LJ. 310.
51 Re City of Portage La Prairie (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 388 (Man. C.A.). In Re
K & B Ambulance Ltd. and City of Prince Albert (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 202, [1978]
1 W.W.R. 39, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that it was not sufficient to
establish discrimination in the exercise of a licensing power merely to show that the
tribunal refused to grant a licence, that it gave no reasons therefor and that a licence
was subsequently granted to another applicant.
52
Re Thibault v. CLRB' (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 526, [1958] O.W.N. 49, 57 C.L.L.C.

715 (H.C.).
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even though it maintains a preferred list of properties
immune from prosecu5
tions for high density use in a single family zone. 3
Even when a public authority has made a decision upon consideration
of the facts of a particular case, it must be free to exercise judgment again
in relation to the same facts where the discretionary power is one that the
legislature intends to be exercised not once for all, but from time to time.
Most subordinate legislative powers are of this kind, 54 as are some powers
of adjudication. Hence, in Turnbull Real Estate v. Sewell it was held that
the action of assessors in giving to a property owner for two successive years
the benefit of a special rate of assessment could not work any estoppel as to
future yearsY5 The power of the assessors was one to be exercised in each
taxation year, so that which was done in one year could not be a proper
exercise of discretion in relation to subsequent years. The House of Lords has
said the same thing in respect of the local valuation courts that perform the
assessment function in the United Kingdom. 56 Public authorities that are
empowered to receive successive applications in respect of the same subjectmatter do not stand in quite the same position: they are justified in making
5
a different decision on a fresh application only if new evidence is adduced. r
The point to be taken from the line of cases that begins with Ayr
HarbourTrustees is this: a public authority is incompetent to give any undertaking that is incompatible with its discretionary power. This includes any
promise not to exercise the power or any promise made in disregard or ignorance of factors intended to influence the discretion. If relevant factors are
known and considered, an undertaking to act in a particular way should be
valid and binding.
53 City of Toronto v. Polai, [1970] 1 O.R. 483, 8 D.L.R. (3d) 689 (C.A.). See also
R. v. Catagas (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 396, holding that a "no-prosecution" policy in
relation to Indians afforded the accused no defence to a charge under the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. M-12. Chief Justice Freedman of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal distinguished the policy from the ordinary exercise of prosecutorial
discretion: "[ln all these instances the prosecutorial discretion is exercised in relation
to a specific case. It is the particular facts of a given case that call that discretion into
play. But that is a far different thing from the granting of a blanket dispensation in
favour of a particular group or race" (at 401). Notice should be taken, however, of a
recent decision of the English Court of Appeal that treats inconsistency in the disposition
of similar cases as a ground of judicial review. In HTV Ltd. v. Price Comm'n, [1976]
I.C.R. 170, 120 S.J. 298 (C.A.), Lord Denning said that if the Commission regularly
interprets the governing legislation in a particular way, and regularly applies it in a
particular way, then "they should continue to interpret it and apply it in the same way
thereafter unless there is good cause for departing from it" (at 185). Mullan, Recent
Developments in Nova Scotia Administrative Law (1978), 4 Dalhousie LJ. 466 at 53138, observes that the HTV case is the only Commonwealth authority where there has
been review on this basis, and he points out that review for inconsistency is at odds with
the general principle that tribunals must not lay down policies in advance by which all
future matters will be decided.
54See R. v. Ontario Milk Marketing Bd. (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 490, and Re
Westminster Mills Ltd. and Anderson (1957), 21 W.W.R. 417.
5 [1937] 2 D.L.R. 218, 12 M.P.R. 136 (N.B.C.A.).
56 Soc'y of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope, [1960] A.C. 551, [1960] 1 All E.R.
317 (H.L.). See also Caffoor v. Comm'r of Income Tax, [1961] A.C. 584, [1961] 2 All
E.R. 436 (P.C., Ceylon).
57 See Mullan, Comments (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 624 at 631 n. 25.
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Ingledew's Ltd. v. Vancouver is a case which shows clearly that the
government may be held to promises that are compatible with discretionary
power.5 8 As part of a redevelopment scheme, the municipal council passed
resolutions authorizing an agreement with developers pursuant to which the
City would be required to expropriate a parcel of land and to provide parking
facilities on sites adjacent to the parcel. The agreement was challenged by an
owner of land in the parcel to be expropriated. It was argued, inter alia, that
the agreement interfered with the discretion of the municipal council. In relation to the provisions of the agreement dealing with parking facilities, the
Court agreed with this argument, because at the time of making the agreement the council could not have considered the many factors that would
make one site more suitable than another and no particular site was identified
in the'agreement. The parcel to be expropriated, however, was specifically
identified. When it resolved to enter into the agreement, the council could and
did consider all factors relevant to the compulsory acquisition of that parcel.
The resolution was in substance a decision to acquire the land, and the discretionary power of the council, far from being abdicated, was actually exercised when the resolution was passed; it was then that the policy of
expropriation was considered. 9
If it can be said that discretion is actually exercised at the time an
undertaking is given, then to make the undertaking binding is not to estop the
authority from exercising its discretionary power. The power is exercised in
making the promise. What does estop a public authority from exercising its
power is to bind it to something done or said otherwise than as a proper
exercise of the discretion. Or, as it is expressed in a leading statement of the
rule, something done "beforehand outside their statutory duty and acting as
private contractors." 0o
58 (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 41, 58 W.W.R. 641 (B.C.S.C.).
5
9 MacDonald J. relied on the judgment of Spence J. in Re Sandwich W. Twp.,
[1960] O.W.N. 387 (H.C.). It involved the validity of a municipal by-law authorizing
an agreement by which the municipality undertook to pass certain redevelopment bylaws. Spence J. said at 388:
Mhe municipality instead of abdicating its power to pass by-laws, or to refuse to
pass them in the future had actually exercised that power in dealing with the
by-law included in the agreement.

e by-laws which it had definitely undertaken to pass were by-laws, which by
the provisions of the Planning Act it was empowered to pass, and the policy of
enacting such by-laws had already been considered when the by-law in question
was enacted.
60 Sunderland Corp. v. Priestman, [1927] 2 Ch. 107 at 116, [1927] All E.R. 460 at
464 per Tomlin J. Comm'rs of Crown Lands v. Page, [1960] 2 Q.B. 274, is a classic
illustration of this statement of the rule. It was held in the Page case that the implied
covenant for quiet enjoyment in a lease from the Crown was not broken by the Crown's
requisition of the leased property in wartime. Lord Evershed said: "I am not, however,
satisfied that in a demise by the Crown the covenant for quiet enjoyment implicit in the
demise would extend to prevent the future exercise by the Crown of powers and duties
imposed upon it in its executive capacity by statute" (at 287). In holding that nothing
can be binding that is not an exercise of the discretionary power, these cases parallel
those which say that there can be no estoppel based on the representations of any person
other than the official who holds the power of decision. R. v. Laister, [1969] 1 O.R. 580,
3 D.L.R. (3d) 272 (H.C.), is a classic case. A town clerk decided that no prosecution
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This is no mere playing with words. Where the legislature confers a
discretionary power, what it wants is not a particular result but an exercise
of judgment. If the official has applied his mind to the facts of the particular
case and has represented what course of action he will follow, then he may
be held to that representation without denying effect to the provisions of the
statute. Nothing in the nature of discretionary powers requires that the official
should be free to change his mind. There is emerging a recognition, therefore,
that he cannot change his mind.
It is well known that tribunals whose powers are purely administrative
are not obliged to hold a hearing unless the statute requires one. What this
means in positive terms is that the discretion of the tribunal extends to choice
of procedure. Yet there are cases suggesting that the tribunal may by its own
assurances preclude itself from acting without a hearing. Two Canadian
judges have expressed that view without invoking estoppel. In one case, Mr.
Justice Milvain of the Alberta Supreme Court said that "where an administrative body embarks upon a hearing to which interested parties are invited to
attend, then such hearing must be conducted along lines consonant with the
principles of natural justice. . . ."61 In an Ontario case, Mr. Justice Hartt
said of the Workmen's Compensation Board that "the Board, having held out
the fact of a hearing both to the applicant and to the public at large, must
then so conduct it in a manner
consistent with those principles which have
612
so often been clearly set out."
In at least one case, the principle of natural justice has served as a basis
for holding a judicial tribunal to its procedural undertaking. In Re Loblaws
Ltd. and Ludlow Investments Ltd., the Ontario Court of Appeal characterized as a breach of natural justice the failure of the municipal Committee of
Adjustment to abide by its undertaking that notice of its decision would be
would be instituted in respect of a clear breach of the municipal zoning by-law, and
he so advised the property owner by letter. It was, however, the Town Council that was
authorized to exercise the discretion in that respect. There being no evidence that the
letter had been sent pursuant to a direction or resolution of the Town Council, the
municipality could not be estopped from instituting the prosecution. There are a number
of other Canadian cases that involve the same rationale. In St. Ann's Island Shooting
and Fishing Club Ltd. v. The King, supra note 6, it was held that the Crown would not
be estopped from challenging leases made by the Superintendent General of Indian
Affairs when the Indian Act required that reserves surrendered to Her Majesty be leased
as directed by the Governor in Council. In Spiers v. Toronto Township (1956), 4
D.L.R. (2d) 330, [1956] O.W.N. 427 (H.C.), a representation from the City Solicitor
that might have been construed as a promise not to enact a restrictive zoning by-law
was held incapable of estopping the municipality. In R. v. Gooderham and Worts Ltd.
(1928), 62 O.L.R. 218, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 109 (S.C.), the act of officials under the Customs
Act in issuing certificates of export could not affect the obligation to prove that the goods
were exported for the purposes of claiming exemption under the Special War Revenue
Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 179. See also Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold, [1903] A.C. 73 (P.C.,
Ont.). A decision of the House of Lords to the same effect is CIR v. Brooks, [1915] A.C.
478 (H.L.), where it was held that in determining liability to super-tax the Special Commissioners were not estopped from fixing taxable income at an amount different from
that determined by the Commissioners for the purposes of ordinary income tax.
01
R. v. City of Calgary (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 477 at 478, 53 W.W.R. 638 at
640 per Milvain J.(Alta. S.C.).
62 R. v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., [1968] 1 O.R. 571 at 573 (H.C.).
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given.63 It is interesting to note that essential elements of estoppel were present:
the party who relied on the promise as to notice missed the time for appealing
to the Ontario Municipal Board.6 It is not clear whether natural justice requires a tribunal to abide by procedural undertakings when these are found
in general directives or manuals not addressed to any particular case. Chief
Justice Laskin, dissenting in Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board, thought that the duty to follow a formal procedure prescribed
for the benefit of inmates arises from its very prescription.63 There are other
cases that say the general rule is otherwise.06 Laskin C.J.C.'s opinion seems
to contradict the principle that discretion must be exercised on the basis of
the merits of the individual case.
In 1972 the English Court of Appeal faced the argument that, since the
government cannot be estopped, it cannot be made to abide by an undertaking
that parties will be heard before a decision is taken.6 7 The case was R. v.
Liverpool Corp. ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators'Association.8 Lord
Denning referred to the principle applied by the House of Lords in Ayr
Harbour Trustees, i.e., that a public corporation cannot contract out of statutory duties. He then said:
But that principle does not mean that a corporation can give an undertaking and
break it as they please. So long as the performance of the undertaking is com69
patible with their public duty, they must honour it.

Here is an authoritative statement of the proposition I made earlier. A public
authority may be held to its promises without being estopped from performing
its duty. If the discretion associated with a power is actually exercised at the
time an assurance is given, then performance of the undertaking is not incompatible with the public duty of the authority. This is what occurred in the

Liverpool case.
De Smith says of the decision that it broke new ground, but he suggests
that it might have limited operation because "quasi-estoppel operated not, it
would seem, to predetermine the substance of the discretionary decision but
to prescribe the procedure by which it had to be reached."70o Once it is admitted, however, that estoppel does apply to government agencies, why should

discretion in procedural matters be distinguished from discretion in substan-

63
64

(1975), 7 O.R. (21) 665, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 329 (C.A.).
Kelly J.A. said, id. at 329-30 (D.L.R.): "[W]hen [the Committee of Adjustment]

gave its assurance to the solicitor that he would be notified, the failure to do so and the
consequent frustration of the exercise of the right to appeal until the time fixed by the
statute had elapsed, was a denial of natural justice ......
65 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 33 C.C.C. (2d) 366.
16 E.g., Re Civil Service Ass'n of Alta. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 48 (Alta. S.C.);
Western Realty ProjectsLtd. v. City of Edmonton, [1974] 5 W.W.R. 131 (Alta. D.C.).
67
In none of the Canadian cases referred to above did the court base its decision
on estoppel.
68 [1972] 2 Q.B. 299, [1972] 2 All E.R. 589 (C.A.).
69 Id. at 308 (Q.B.).
70
Supranote 4, at 91.
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tive matters? 71 I think, with respect, that Lord Denning had no intention of
limiting his reasoning to the particular situation involved in the Liverpool
case. He supplied a test to determine when undertakings are binding, and the
test is applicable generally to discretionary powers: is the performance of
the undertaking compatible with the public duty?
Indeed, it seems to me that Lord Denning had earlier applied "quasiestopper' to the substance of a discretionary decision. In Lever, the power
of the municipal corporation to issue an enforcement notice depended on
whether, in its judgment, the variation in construction was "material." The
corporation's planning officer had said earlier that the variation was immaterial, and on that basis the corporation had no power to issue a notice. But,
of course, if the corporation were permitted to exercise judgment on the
matter a second time and to determine that the variation was material, then
its power to issue a notice would be revived. Lord Denning held that the
initial determination, taking the form of an assurance from the planning officer, was binding on the corporation. It could not consider the matter again
because the developer had acted on the assurance by proceeding with construction. 72 This is not merely my own understanding of what was done in
Lever; in the Liverpool case Lord Denning cited his earlier decision as authority for holding the municipal corporation to its undertaking in relation to
procedure.
There is a small group of important Canadian cases in which representations have operated to predetermine the substance of discretionary decisions.
In each case, the public authority enjoyed the power to make the particular
decision which the court found it was by its prior representation bound to
make. And in each case it could be said that the element of discretion associated with the power had been actually exercised at the time of that representation. As a result, though bound by its undertakings, the authority was not
estopped from performing its public duty.
One case, Re Multi-Malls Inc. and Minister of Transportation,straddles
the distinction between substance and procedure.7 8 Under The Planning Act
of Ontario the Minister is authorized to approve the draft official plan of a
71There is, of course, the constitutional principle applied to a legislative body:
while it is not bound by self-imposed restraints as to the content, substance or policy
of its enactments, it may be bound by self-imposed procedural (or manner and form)
restraints on its enactments. See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1977) at 201. This may only reflect that the discretion associated with legislative powers is not to be exercised once for all but from time to time. Accordingly,
undertakings as to the substance of future legislative action are not compatible with
the discretionary powers.
72Lord Denning M.R. said of the planning officer's assurance: "being acted on, it
is binding on the council." Supra note 32, at 203 (Q.1.). Lord Denning did not refer
to his earlier judgment in Robertson v. Min. of Pensions, supra note 6, in which he
denied that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action. When
a public authority has made a decision, he said, "I see no reason for implying a term
that the Crown is to be at liberty to revoke the decision at its pleasure and without cause."
Id. at 231-32 (K.B.). That same thinking is behind Lord Denning's recent judgment in
HTV Ltd. v. Price Comm'n, supra note 53.
73 (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 49, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 18 (C.A.).
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municipality. Section 15(1) provides that the Minister may refer any part of
the plan to the Municipal Board and that he do so upon request by any
person. Upon the submission to him of a draft plan, the Minister gave his
assurance that a particular aspect of the plan (in respect of which the Minister had been requested to make a modification) would be referred to the
Municipal Board. As it happened, the Minister did not refer the matter, and
he approved the plan without the modification requested. The Ontario Court
of Appeal held that the Minister's approval was not valid. Giving judgment
for the Court, Lacourci~re J.A. relied on the decision of the English Court
of Appeal in the Liverpool case. He said:
In my view, on this basis, it was implicit in the assurances given by the Ministry
that the plan would not be approved without the requested modifications unless
there was a reference to the Board. The appellants relied on the assurances to
their detriment, as they themselves could and would have requested the Minister
to refer the matter. The Liverpool decision ...imposed on the Minister, in accordance with natural justice if not by estoppel, the duty not to give approval to
the unmodified official plan without referring the matter to the Municipal Board
for a public hearing, in accordance with his statutory duty and the assurances
74
given. (Emphasis added)

In this case, as in Liverpool, the public authority chose to decide a
question before circumstances had arisen calling for the appropriate executive
action. It sometimes happens that executive action is separated from the
determination of a question by the very nature of that determination. In
licensing matters, for example, the authority may require certain actions of
the applicant as a condition of granting the licence. The decision to issue the
licence if the conditions are met is effectively made, but issuance of the licence
is postponed until that happens. Lever shows that the determination of the
question is conclusive,7 5 and so do some Canadian cases. In Cutt v. City of
Langley, the municipal council responded to an application for a building
permit by passing a resolution as follows: "That... the Council now agrees
to the granting of a building permit for the proposed hotel.., on the condition that all the off-street parking required be located on property owned by
the applicants. '7 6 The applicants acted upon the resolution by purchasing
additional property and carrying out demolition to prepare it for parking
facilities. Subsequently, the council reconsidered its earlier resolution and
defeated the motion. The British Columbia Supreme Court awarded mandamus
to compel the issuance of a building permit. Having made the decision to
grant a permit, the council was bound to issue one, provided only that the
applicants fulfilled the conditions which had been imposed. 77 In British
74 Id. at 34-35 (D.L.R.).
75 In that case, the determination that the variation in construction was immaterial
made any executive action unnecessary.
76 [1975] 2 W.W.R. 756 (B.S.S.C.).
77id. at 761. Re Cogan (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 661, 46 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (D.C.)
supports this position. The issuance of a building permit was delayed for some considerable period of time while the developer endeavoured to cooperate in solving certain
municipal problems in which it was under no legal obligation to become involved. A
revised application for a permit was subsequently refused because in the meantime the
municipality had expressed a clear intent to rezone. The Court awarded mandamus on
the ground that it would be "unjust and inequitable" that the applicant should be
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Columbia Hop Co. Ltd. v. Districtof Kent, the municipal council agreed that
it would close a road across the plaintiffs land if the plaintiff would transfer
other land to it for use as a highway. 78 This the plaintiff did, but no by-law
closing the road was ever passed. Years later the municipality relied on the
absence of a by-law to support its position that the old road was still open.
Macdonald I. said:
Would it not, however, be inequitable to allow any such claim, for a roadway,
as is now asserted by the municipality, to be set up to the detriment of the plaintiff's right to use of the property? I think the facts call for the application of the
principle of estoppel, insofar as the powers of the municipality could have been
exercised to effect the intention of the parties.
The municipality should be precluded, as a private individual would have been
under like circumstances, from denying ... that the road in question should continue to be closed. This was the intention of the parties and should be implemented by the council of the municipality, insofar as its power extends. 79

These decisions are supported by the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Re Violi.8 0 Two brothers were ordered deported under the
Immigration Act, and their appeals to the Immigration Appeal Board were
dismissed. Section 31(4) of the Act empowered the Minister to review the
decision of the Appeal Board in any case and, for that purpose, to direct
that the execution of the deportation order be stayed pending his review and
decision. The Minister decided to review the cases, and he issued orders
directing that the execution of the deportation orders be stayed for a period
of twelve months (six months in the case of one brother) "to give you a
chance to demonstrate that you can rehabilitate yourself," at the end of which
time the Minister would make his decision based on reports from the Immigration Department. The brothers apparently behaved themselves, and they
heard nothing from the Department for a period of three years. They then
received notices that the Minister had confirmed the deportation orders, and
they were arrested for the purpose of deportation. A majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the Minister had no power to order deportation
after expiry of the "probationary periods" in the absence of any event occurring during that time that would have justified his so doing. Martland J. said
that the order directing a stay was really more than that; it was in substance
a decision to quash the deportation orders conditional on good behaviour. 8'
It was an exercise of the Minister's power of review, and he enjoyed no
authority to reconsider that decision or to carry out a further review.
Alexander v. Village of Huntsville is a similar sort of case.8 2 A by-law
exempting property from taxation had been passed pursuant to an agreement
affected by the expressed intention to rezone. In substance, the municipality was required
to issue a permit because the decision to grant one had been made before the rezoning
resolution was passed.
78 [1925] 3 D.L.R. 171, [1925] 2 W.W.R. 31 (B.C.S.C.).
79 Id. at 175 (D.L.R.).
80 [1965] S.C.R. 232, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 506, 46 C.R. 68, [1966] 1 C.C.C. 8.
81
It was as if the Minister had allowed the appeals from the Immigration Appeal
Board, conditional on good behaviour, as opposed simply to staying execution of the

orders.
82 (1894), 24 O.R. 665 (C.P.).
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between the municipality and the property owner. There was a breach of the
agreement, giving rise to a power in the municipality to repeal the exempting
by-law. But the council resolved instead not to take advantage of the breach
of condition and to confirm the exempting by-law. It was held that this action
prevented the municipality from subsequently passing a by-law to repeal the
exemption. The council had already exercised its discretion on the matter,
and it was not free to consider the question again. Rose J. said:
Whether it be called acquiescence, waiver, election, or estoppel, it seems to me
the facts above stated, prevent the corporation taking advantage of the [breach]
to declare a forfeiture or put an end to the exemption ... .83

If an authority is bound to take substantive executive action in accordance with its prior determinations, then it is but a short step, or perhaps
no step at all, to hold that a promise of future executive action is binding if
that promise necessarily involves a determination of the question upon which
the propriety of executive action depends. Promises of that sort relating,
arguably at least, to procedural action have been held binding. 4 Nothing in
logic or reason requires that a line be drawn there.
Re Smith and The Queens : and Re Smith and Municipality of Vanier0
are perhaps the strongest of the cases being considered here because each
clearly crosses that line. In the first case, a Crown prosecutor broke his promise not to prosecute someone in return for information. Berger . granted a
writ of prohibition on the ground of abuse of process and violation of the
fundamental principles of justice. He said: "I think what occurred in this case
constitutes oppression. The ordinary man is entitled to expect that the Crown
will keep its word."8 7 The facts of the second case are somewhat more complicated, but the principle applied is the same. Smith applied for a licence to
operate a public hall. The municipality enjoyed a statutory power to grant
or refuse the licence in its discretion. The licence was refused. Smith commenced mandamus proceedings, and the respondent municipality based its
answer entirely on three deficiencies relating to fire safety and insurance.
Smith did not contest the deficiencies and his mandamus application was
83 Id. at 674.
84 Re Multi-Malls, supra note 73, is the leading Canadian case.
85 (1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 268 (B.C.S.C.). I am indebted to Professor David

Mullan for drawing this case to my attention. See Mullan, supra note 53, at 473-74.
86 [1973] 1 O.R. 110, 30 D.L.R. (3d) 386 (H.C.).
87
S upra note 85, at 272. Professor Mullan, supra note 53, at 474n., points out that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rourke v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R.
1027, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193, [1977] 5 W.W.R. 487, 35 C.C.C. (2d) 129, has thrown
into considerable doubt this emerging ground of judicial review, at least in the context of criminal proceedings. It should perhaps be noted at this point that the decision
in Re Smith and the Queen, supra note 85, does not contradict what was decided in
Southend-on-Sea Corp. v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd., supra note 28. It was held there
that a mistaken representation relating to the substantive requirements of legislation
could not fetter the discretion of the public authority in issuing an enforcement notice.
The difference between the two cases is that the representation in Re Smith related to a
matter in respect of which the public authority (Crown Prosecutor) enjoyed an authoritative power of decision. An official with enforcement powers has no authoritative power
to decide whether the provisions of the statute have been violated, but he may decide
authoritatively whether the enforcement machinery should be applied in any particular
case.
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dismissed. He did, however, take steps to remedy the deficiencies and then
launched a second application for mandamus. The second application was
necessary because in the interim the municipal council had passed a resolution that "in the public interest a licence to operate a public hall not be
issued." The Ontario High Court awarded mandamus. The expressed basis
of the decision was bad faith, but the label is not important. The municipality
had by its own conduct limited its freedom of executive action, and the
language of the judgment reflects an aversion to precisely the kind of injustice
that gives the principle of estoppel its appeal. Pennell J.said:
Would not a reasonable man be entitled to assume from the posture of the Municipal Council on return of the first motion that approval would be forthcoming
if he remedied the deficiencies? In the present case, the applicant ordered his
affairs accordingly. Then, after completing the deficiencies with the financial consequences which that entailed he finds that the Council refused to issue the
licence ....I am of opinion that there was a want of good faith in law and
accordingly an order of mandamus may issue. 88

Here, it could not be said that the council had decided to issue a licence
subject to conditions; at best, there was a promise of future executive action
implicit in the council's conduct. And if estoppel operated here, it operated
to predetermine the substance of the discretionary action.
But there is something even more significant about the Smith case. If
there was a promise of future action, it was a promise only in the mind of the
applicant, because it is apparent that the municipality had no intention of
issuing the licence, whether or not the deficiencies were remedied.8 There
is no possibility of explaining the decision simply on the basis that the municipality had made a decision that it was not free to reconsider. It must be added
that the municipality was taken to have decided what it did not decide and,
perhaps, what it had no intention of deciding. Putting the matter another way,
the municipality was estopped from saying that it had not decided to issue
the licence if the deficiencies were remedied.
One of the minority judges in the Quebec Court of Appeal had invoked
the same principle when Re Violi was before that Court.90 The basis of the
judgment of Montgomery J.was not that the Minister had decided to quash
the deportation orders, but that his lack of action on the matter gave that
appearance. He said that, after expiry of the probationary periods, it was
reasonable for the brothers to suppose that the original deportation orders
had lapsed, and the Minister's extended procrastination was "such as to constitute an implied renunciation. . . of the right to carry into effect the original
deportation orders." 9' 1
There is a recent decision of the Alberta Supreme Court that lends sup88 Supra note 86, at 116 (O.R.), 392 (D.L.R.). In Re Rodenbush and Dist. of N.
Cowichan (1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 731 at 735, Ruttan J. of the British Columbia
Supreme Court said that a municipal council acted in "bad faith" when it rezoned land
to prohibit a particular development after having lulled the developer into a belief that
his application for a permit would be approved.
89 Itappears that the Council had not addressed its mind to the matter until after
the deficiencies had been remedied.
9o Supranote 80.
91 Id.at 511 (D.L.R.) (Emphasis added).
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port to this position, though it stops short of the full implications of estoppel.
In R. v. Industrial Coal and Minerals, a lessee of Crown mineral rights ap-

plied to the Minister for a renewal of its lease. 92 The right of the lessee to a

continuation of the lease depended upon whether "in the opinion of the

Minister," there was a well capable of production on the property. The lessee
asserted in his application for renewal that there was such a well. It was
almost two months later, and only nine days before the expiry date of the
lease, that the Department replied, and it did so by requiring the lessee to
prove production capability by drilling a new well. Relying on the notion that
administrative bodies must act fairly, the Court held that the Minister was
not free to exercise his discretion in that fashion. The Minister was required
to give the lessee a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the Department's drilling
requirements. This had not been done. Indeed, "the department's belated
response

. . .

to the applicant's assertion of a right was, in effect, no com-

munication at all."' 93 In the absence of any alternative solution, it seems that
the Court would have been prepared to hold that the Minister had no power
at that late date to question the applicant's assertion. However, rather than
relieving the lessee altogether of the drilling requirement, the Court declared
that the lease should continue in effect for such period of time as would give
the lessee a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the requirement. If an administrator must act promptly, it is not difficult to infer a decision favourable to
the individual from a failure to do so.
What I have said here may be summarized as follows. A public authority
cannot be estopped from exercising its powers. But once the authority has
decided that a particular exercise of power is appropriate, it must act accordingly, at least where there has been reliance on that decision. 94 A promise of
92

[1977] 4 W.W.R. 35 (Alta. S.C.).

93 Id.at 45 per Moshansky J.
94

There are, of course, cases in which courts have refused, for one reason or
another, to hold a public authority to a representation that might have been construed
as an exercise of decision-making power. In Re Armstrong and Canadian Nickel Co.
Ltd., [1970] 1 O.R. 708, 9 D.L.R. (3d) 330, a Mining Commissioner who had granted
an order extending the life of a mining claim then refused to overturn the acceptu
ance by the mining recorder of an adverse claim filed after the orler was granted
but before registration. The Court said at 337 (D.L.R.): "Imight in view of the almost
contradictory action... of his own office... have reached a different conclusion; but
this Court cannot substitute an opinion of its own for that of an administrative tribunal
without the clearest evidence, lacking here, that the tribunal has abrogated its function."
In Re Cambridge Leaseholds Ltd. and City of Toronto, [1973] 3 O.R. 395, 37 D.L.R.
(3d) 60, the Ontario High Court refused to quash a rezoning by-law for bad faith
though the property in question had been purchased on the faith of assurances from
local aldermen and the municipal planning staff that the proposed development could
proceed. The Court could find no basis to quash though it "strongly animadverted on
proceedings, taken by the council contrary to stipulations or arrangements previously
made. . . ." at 63-64 (D.L.R.) quoting Marten J.A., Re Howard and City of Toronto
(1928), 61 O.L.R. 563 at 577, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 952 at 967 (H.C.). In Bay Village Shopping Centre Ltd. v. City of Victoria, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 418 (B.C.S.C.), a Council resolution to enter into a land use contract with the plaintiff was taken to be "a mere expression
of willingness to enter into an agreement. . . ," which the council could revoke at any
time. This accords with the view expressed by Lord Denning in Robertson v. Min. of
Pensions, supra note 6, at 231 (K.B.), 770 (All E.R.), that a public authority is not
bound by a mere expression of intention, as opposed to a promise intended to be
binding.
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future executive action is binding precisely because it necessarily involves a
decision that the promised action is an appropriate exercise of the power. To
this point, nothing more is involved than the proposition that decisions made
cannot be reconsidered, even though they may not have been implemented
by executive action.05 But the principle is taken one step further in cases such
as Re Smith and Municipality of Vanier. When the authority by its conduct
leads the individual to believe that a decision has been made, it is to be
treated as having made that decision. And having made it, the authority must
act accordingly.
This last extension of the principle may seem innocent enough, but it
poses a real problem. When it confers a discretionary power, the legislature
wants an exercise of judgment by the public authority. The object of the
statute must not be defeated. This would seem to foreclose the possibility of
requiring administrative action that contradicts the judgment of the authority.
Yet that is precisely what was required in Re Smith and Municipality of
Vanier. The municipality was not required to act in accordance with any
actual exercise of its discretionary power. It was an apparent exercise of
judgment that was binding.
IV. THE ULTRA VIRES PROBLEM
In cases such as Woon v. MNR it was said that the Crown cannot be
estopped. The concept of an authoritative power of decision was invoked to
distinguish such cases from those in which government agencies have been
held to their earlier determinations. In applying that concept, however, it
became apparent that estoppel was not necessarily the operative principle.
The principle is simply that an agency has no power to reconsider its authori95
The binding quality of promises parallels the restraint on the power of government agencies to rescind their formal decisions. A valid judicial determination cannot
be rescinded by the body making it save on very limited grounds, and the competence
of administrative bodies to rescind their decisions depends heavily on considerations of
equity and public policy. De Smith, supra note 4, at 93-94. Indeed, Canadian courts
lean to the view that administrative decisions cannot be rescinded in the absence of
express statutory authority. Compare Canadian Industries Ltd. v. Development Appeal
Bd. of Edmonton (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 727, 71 W.W.R. 635 (Alta. C.A.); Zorba's
Food Services Ltd. v. City of Edmonton (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 618, 74 W.W.R. 218
(Alta. C.A.); Cheeseworth v. City of Toronto (1921), 49 O.L.R. 68, 58 D.L.R. 665
(S.C.); Lambert v. Alberta Teachers' Assn, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 184; Re Lugano and MMI
(1977), 15 N.R. 251, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 625 (Fed. C.A.); and Re City of Brantford and
Bray, [1972] 2 O.R. 525, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 129 (C.A.); with Grillasv. MMI, [1972] S.C.R.
577, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 1; Re Wall and Redevelop Corp. and Vancouver (1974), 47 D.L.R.
(3d) 155 (B.C.C.A.); and Re Lornex Mining Corp. and Bukwa (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d)
705, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 554 (B.C.S.C.). In the case of judicial tribunals, it is res judicata
or estoppel by record that prevents the tribunal from reconsidering a matter in respect of
which it has rendered final judgment. See Jowett v. Earl of Bradford, [1977] 2 All E.R.
33 (Employment Appeal Tribunal). I agree with de Smith, however, that "the concept of
res judicatain administrative law is so nebulous as to occlude rather than clarify practical

issues ..

',(supra note

4, at 94). Re Fernie Mem. Hosp. Soe'y and Duthie (1963), 42

W.W.R. 511 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 477, 47 W.W.R. 120 (B.C.C.A.),
is a good example of the distracting influence of the concept. A hospital board reversed
its decision to reinstate an employee. The Court held that the board was free to do so
because it was an administrative tribunal to which the principle of res judicata does not
apply. The Court did not consider whether on any other grounds the decision of the board
ought to have been irreversible.
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tative determinations where these have been relied on by persons affected.
No case has yet been made for estoppel against the government. We now
reach the question whether a public authority can be bound by a determination not properly made, or not made at all.
The issue arose in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, and Lord Denning
constructed a principle to deal with it.96 An army officer wrote to the War
Office regarding his pension rights arising from a disability. The War Office
had no power over the administration of pensions, but it replied nonetheless
that the plaintiff's case had been duly considered and that his disability had
been accepted as attributable to military service. The plaintiff relied to his
detriment on this advice. The Minister of Pensions decided subsequently that
the plaintiff's disability was not attributable to military service. Lord Denning
thought that the plaintiff should not be prejudiced by any lack of authority
in the War Office. He said:
[1]f a government department in its dealings with a subject takes it upon itself to
assume authority upon a matter with which he is concerned, he is entitled to rely
upon it having the authority which it assumes.
He does not know, and cannot be
97
expected to know, the limits of its authority.

As a result, the Minister of Pensions was bound by the War Office determination.
Lord Denning's principle is broad enough to produce a different result
even in a case like Woon v. MNR. 98 The Minister would be bound by the unequivocal ruling of the Commissioner of Income Tax, though the Commissioner
had no authoritative power of decision. It is well known that the principle did
not appeal to the House of Lords. When Lord Denning repeated it in a subsequent case, 99 he was rebuked in language I have already quoted, as follows:
[l-t is certain that neither a minister nor any subordinate officer of the Crown
can by any conduct or misrepresentation bar the Crown from enforcing a statutory prohibition or from prosecuting for its breach.100

What is remarkable about that language is the reference to a "statutory prohibition." The House of Lords rejected Lord Denning's principle just because
it would produce a different result in such cases as Woon v. MNR, cases in
which assurances are given by someone having no authoritative power of
decision in the matter. The net had been cast too widely.
Without Lord Denning's principle, however, there seems to be no basis
for holding a public authority to a decision which it did not or could not
legally make. Government agencies can be held to determinations made in
exercise of an authoritative power of decision because the statute does not
demand any particular result. It does, however, demand a decision by the
agency and it places limits on the authoritative character of the decision. It
must be one made within jurisdiction. It would seem that to require the
96

Supra note 6.

97 Id. at 232 (K.B.), 770 (All E.R.).
98

Supranote 22.
Falmouth Boat Constr. v. Howell, supra note 35.
100 Howell v. Falmouth Boat Constr., supra note 36, at 849 (A.C.) per Normand

99
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agency to abide by an ultra vires decision would defeat the operation of the
statute no less than to hold an agency having no authoritative power of decision to an earlier representation.
Generally the cases take that view of the matter. In R. v. City of Toronto,
a developer applied for a building permit to construct an apartment hotel on
lands zoned for other purposes.10 ' The permit was refused. The developer
applied for mandamus on the ground that he had previously been issued a
building permit for the development in question (that permit having expired).
The Ontario High Court found that the issuance of the first permit was invalid
as contrary to the zoning by-law. As a result, it could form no basis for
asserting an obligation on the municipality to issue a second permit. 102 The
municipality had indeed determined that the development complied with the
by-law, but that determination was erroneous and invalid. The Divisional
Court in Ontario followed the same reasoning in Re David Gallo Building
Co. and City of Toronto.0 3 An application for a building permit was filed in
September, 1972, but structural, electrical and mechanical drawings were not
submitted as required by the building by-law. It was not until February, 1973,
that the applicant was told the complete drawings would be required. In the
meantime, the applicant had completed its purchase of the development property and the City had expressed its intention to pass a rezoning by-law that
would not accommodate the applicant's proposal. In applying for mandamus
to compel the issuance of a building permit, the developer argued that by
specific waivers and consistent practice, the City had waived the requirements
of the building by-law as to drawings, or had at least lulled the applicant into
a false sense of security. The Court held, however, that the conduct of the
City could not convert a deficient application into one worthy of a mandatory
order for a permit.
Those who rely on legal rights must comply with the legal requirements. They
cannot absolutely rely on the sensible indulgences often granted by public servants .... These may be discontinued as readily as they were instituted or maintained.104

These cases proceed on the principle that, if a public authority acts ultra vires
in giving an assurance, it cannot be binding on that authority. 0 5 No estoppel
can be created by an ultra vires determination.
But all the judges do not give up at that point in the search for a way
to avoid inconsistency in the conduct of government business. Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government involved facts similar to those in the
Lever case.10 6 Developers received an enforcement notice from a planning
authority that had previously ruled no planning permission was required for
the development in question. The determination that no planning permission
was required was apparently invalid because the formalities required by stat101 [19711 1 O.P 451, 21 D.L.R. (3d) 541 (H.C.).
02

1

The only real issue in the case was whether the issuance of the first permit was

valid or invalid.
103 [19731 3 O.R. 892, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 536 (D.C.).
0 4
1 Id. at 543 (D.L.R.) per Wright J.
105 See de Smith, supra note 4, at 90 and cases cited at 89, nn. 44 and 46.
106 Supra note 40.
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ute for making it had not been followed. How could the Court of Appeal
resist the contradictory government action without giving binding effect to an
invalid determination? Lord Denning found two ways, although he did not
clearly distinguish one from the other. The first was to say that there was no
defect in procedure, or at least not one making the determination ultra vires.
I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity
can be waived, even by a 07
public authority, so as to render valid that which
would otherwise be invalid.

The second had broader implications. It was estoppel in classic form. The
authority was estopped from denying the validity of its determination. It was
simply not allowed to say in relation to its consistent practice in ruling on the
need for planning 08
permission that the practice was all wrong and its assurances of no effect.'

Here was a public body having and purporting to exercise an authoritative power of decision. It could not say to someone relying on that state of
affairs that the power had not been exercised, that the decision had not been
made. The authority was not estopped by an ultra vires determination; rather,
it was estopped from saying that the determination was ultra vires. Given a
valid decision, it was binding for the same reasons as were the decisions in
Cutt v. City of Langley and Re Violi. The binding effect of the decision was not
the result of estoppel.
The Wells case has, of course, great potential, but it is not likely to be
realized unless Lord Denning's notion that an authority may be estopped
from pleading ultra vires is secure. The truth is that there are countless decisions to the contrary. 0 9 Where the Minister of Agriculture exceeds his statutory authority in granting a lease, it is said that he is not estopped from
denying the lease; to hold otherwise would enable the Minister by estoppel
to do an act which is ultra vires."10 Where a school board enters into a contract without following the required procedure in relation to conduct of meetings, it is said that no course of conduct otherwise sufficient to raise an
estoppel can preclude a corporate body from setting up its own breach of
statutory duty by way of defence to an action on contract."'
Yet in its most recent canvass of the issue, the Supreme Court of Canada
has indicated that the rule is not nearly so absolute as these cases would
suggest. In Silver's Garage Ltd. v. Bridgewater, certain snow removal equipment was supplied to and used by the town as a result of negotiations carried
on for the town by two aldermen and two employees."12 In an action for the
price of the goods, the town successfully defended on the ground that there
could be no contract without the authorization of the town council. Because
107 1d. at 1044 (All E.R.).
108

Lord Denning really collapsed the two bases for his conclusion by saying that

the public authority can be estopped from relying on technicalities.
109
See
110

de Smith, supra note 4, at 88-90.
Min. of Agriculture v. Matthews, [1950] 1 K.B. 148, [1949] 2 All E.R. 724.
'11 Waterman-Waterbury Mfg. Co. v. Slavanka School Dist., [1929] 2 D.L.R. 161,
[1923] 1 W.W.R. 598, 23 Sask. L.R. 338 (CA.).
112 [1971] S.C.R. 577, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
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there was no collective action of the council related in any way to the purchase of the equipment, the case was said to be distinguishable from those in
which contracts lacking only the formality of a seal or by-law were held to
be enforceable if fully performed by the other contracting party. The Court
said that the absence of statutory requirements is "not necessarily fatal" to
the claim of the other party if there is a resolution of council authorizing the
contract. 1 3
Why should the existence of a resolution of council alter the result? The
fact remains that the contract would not have been entered into in compliance
with statutory requirements. The answer must be that the council enjoys an
authoritative power of decision in the matter; it alone enjoys the power to
create contractual rights against the municipality. And the body having that
power may be estopped from denying that it has been exercised. 14 This was
the answer given in Biggs v. Township of Egremont, a recent decision of the
Ontario High Court upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal."15 Land was
conveyed by the municipality on the authority of a resolution. The municipality received the consideration and approximately two years later attempted
to renege on the contract. The Court found that the doctrine of estoppel was
applicable to prevent the municipality from arguing the necessity of having
a by-law. Lerner J. said:
Where the transaction is of a contractual nature and is an executed one, the
municipality, having received the benefits coming to it under the contract, may be
prevented from denying it is not [sic] bound by it although it was authorized by
a simple resolution."16

If the municipality were not estopped in these circumstances, the other party

would be "sorely prejudiced" by his reliance on the conduct of the council."17

Though Lerner J. might have limited the application of estoppel to the
particular circumstance of executed contracts, there are earlier cases that
apply the same principle to other aspects of municipal affairs. In Bloomfield
v. Municipality of Starland,for example, the municipal council passed a reso-8
lution to keep open to the public a road passing through the applicant's land."1
The applicant then sought compensation as provided for under municipal
I's Id. at 9 (D.L.R.).
114 In an earlier case, the Ontario High Court had emphasized that estoppel could
not be invoked against a municipality without some action by the body having authoritative power of decision. Kingstone J. said in Ottawa Electric Ry. v. City of Ottawa, [1934]
O.W.N. 265 at 268 (H.C.): "In order to create an estoppel where a municipal corporation is concerned, assuming that the law of estoppel does apply to a municipal corporation, something in the nature of a corporate act must be established. Here no such
corporate act has been proved, and the acts of an official in the engineering department,
without authority from the council itself, in no way binds the city or obligates it to the
course of conduct pursued by that official."
115 (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 72, 49 D.L.R. (3d) 491 (H.C.), aff'd (1976), 12 O.R.
(2d) 18, 67 D.L.R. (3d) 605 (C.A.).
116 (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 72 at 83, 49 D.L.R. (3d) 491 at 502, quoting from Rogers.
1 Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (2d ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1971) at 421-22.
1'7 See also R. v. County of Perth (1884), 6 O.R. 195 (C.P.).
11 (1915), 21 D.L.R. 859, 31 W.L.R. 573 (Alta. S.C.), aIJ'd (1916), 25 D.L.R. 43,
32 W.L.R. 905, 9 W.W.R. 552 (C.A.).
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legislation. The municipality argued that the power to keep open a road was
one that could be exercised only by by-law. Stuart J. answered:
In my opinion, it is not now open to the council, having acted by resolution, having exercised the power even though informally, having forced Bloomfield to open
the trail, to turn around now and object that they themselves had proceeded irregularly and that therefore the owner must be driven to an action. There is no
reason in my opinion why the principal [sic] of estoppel should not be applied
against them. 119

In another case, a municipality that had initiated expropriation proceedings
but refused to submit the compensation award for judicial confirmation was

estopped from denying that notice of the expropriation had been properly
given . 2 0 The Wells case itself has been followed and applied in a decision of
the Chancery Division. In Re L, a local authority made an order vesting in
itself parental rights over an infant. 121 The mother filed a notice of objection,
the effect of which was to appeal the order to the Juvenile Court. Subsequently, the local authority made a new order, saying that the first order had
not been properly made, but it told the mother that no further notice of
objection would be required. The mother relied on that advice. The Court
held that the corporation was estopped from alleging that no notice of objection had been received within the statutory time limit. It was estopped from
relying on technicalities that related to the legal effect of its own order. It had
represented its order to be one subject to appeal and it was estopped from
saying otherwise.
I have shown earlier that an assurance given by a public authority will
be binding if it involves an exercise of an authoritative power of decision.
And it now appears, Lord Denning's notion being defensible, that a public
authority may be estopped from denying that it has exercised a power of
decision. It follows that a public authority may be bound to take executive
action in accordance with a purported or apparent exercise of its decisionmaking power. Two points must be emphasized. First, estoppel does not
require the public authority to do an ultra vires act.122 Rather, it shields from
the eyes of the court the invalidity of an act already done, and appropriate
legal consequences are made to follow as if the act were valid. Second, estoppel
is of no assistance in relation to the acts of a person without any authoritative
power of decision. If legal consequences do not depend on his determinations,
then the question simply does not arise whether they are valid or invalid.
Thus, the principle applied in Wells would not alter the result in cases such
119 Id. at 860-61 (D.L.R.) (Alta. S.C.).
120 Scott v. City of Winnipeg (1895), 11 Man. R. 84. As in the Wells case, the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench found two bases for its decision. The first was that the
slight departures from statute in giving the notice were irregularities only, that might be
waived by the laches or subsequent acts of the municipality. The second was estoppel.
See, however, Gold Range Hotel Ltd. v. Plains-Western Gas and Electric Co. (1964),
50 W.W.R. 654 (N.W.T.C.A.) holding that an informal resolution of the municipal
council cannot give legal effect to an agreement even though both parties may have
acted in accordance with its terms.
121 [19711 3 All E.R. 743 (Ch. D.).
n2De Smith says, supra note 4, at 88, "a public body with limited powers cannot
bind itself to act ultra vires."
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as Millett v. The Queen or Woon v. MNR. The decision in Silver's Garage
Ltd. v. Bridgewateris, I think, proof of this point.'2 3
The full implications of the principle applied by Lord Denning in Wells
have achieved little explicit recognition. An exceptional instance is Lord
Denning's own judgment in Lever.124 The developer had relied on an assurance that the proposed variations in construction were not material. There
was no substantive basis for challenging that determination: it may have been
in error, but an authority does not necessarily exceed its jurisdiction by erring
on questions of law or fact. The problem was that the assurance had been
given by the municipal planning officer and not by the public authority itself.
The authority said that the representations of the officer should not be binding
because it had delegated no authority to him. Lord Denning noted, however,
that it had been the practice of the planning authority to allow its officers to
advise applicants in respect of variations. By that conduct, it was estopped
from saying that there had been no proper determination of the question
decided by the officer. 125 That determination was binding and it undermined
the power of the authority to issue an enforcement notice.
An earlier decision of the English Court of Appeal involved the same
principle in a similar context. In North Western Gas Board v. Manchester
Corp., the statutory duty of the corporation depended on whether certain
amounts paid to it by the board were "rates actually levied" on the board. 126
The corporation had designated the amounts as "rates" in its accounts to the
board, but it later took the position that the amounts collected were not
leviable as rates under the applicable rating legislation. In other words, the
corporation was saying that it could not do what it had purported to do.
Sellers L.J held that the corporation was estopped from taking that position.
The board had been prejudiced by the conduct of the corporation because it
would not have paid the money unless it was paid as rates.
There are a few Canadian cases which show that an authority may be
bound in the exercise of its powers by a determination not properly made or
not made at all. In School Trustees of Brockville v. Town Council of Brockville, a case very much like North Western Gas Board, the town council
denied that it had properly approved the estimates of the school board, saying
that the estimates had not been laid before it as required by statute. 27 But
the council had recognized the estimates by paying a portion of the amount
requested, and Robinson C.J. held that this precluded the council from objecting that the estimates had not been properly laid before it. The council
=23The determinations of an official who has no authoritative power of decision
cannot be relied on. See R. v. Laister, supra note 119, and cases cited in note 60 supra
The cause of some confusion on this point is that assurances given by a person without
any authoritative power of decison may be described as ultra vires, and the court may
say that no estoppel can be created by an ultra vires determination.
124 Supra note 32.
12
5 The officer had "ostensible authority," that is to say, authority arising out of a
representation from the Corporation.
'2 6 Supra note 32.
127 (1852), 9 U.C.Q.B. 302.
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was obliged to perform its statutory duty to pay the estimates, as if they had
been properly submitted and approved.
In MadisonDevelopment Corp. v. Town of St. Albert, a developer applied
for a permit.12 8 Three months passed and the development officer did not
deliver any decision. The developer applied for an order of mandamus to
compel the officer to issue a permit. It appeared that the application for a
permit was deficient in certain respects. The proposed development complied
in substance with the zoning and building by-law, but the application did not
include various particulars required under the by-law. The issue arose whether
the officer could rely on those deficiencies as a basis for refusing the application when they had not been brought to the attention of the developer at any
time before the mandamus proceedings. By awarding mandamus, the Court
held, in effect, that the officer could not assert his lack of power to issue the
permit. It is true that the failure of the officer promptly to advise of the deficiencies was not the only factor which prevented his relying on them. There
was in addition the assertion by the town that it was relying upon the failure
of the applicant to avail himself of appeal procedures and not upon the deficiencies as the reason for opposing the mandamus order. Still, the judgment
does suggest that the officer had in any event precluded himself from showing
that the application did not comply with the by-law.12 9 His silence was a
representation that the application was in order, and this created a duty to
issue the permit.
Estoppel emerges more clearly as the basis for decision in Re George
Herczeg Ltd. and City of Toronto,130 a case that may usefully be compared
with Re David Gallo. The City defended its refusal of a building permit on
the ground, inter alia, that the application was deficient under the zoning bylaw because it included material relating only to excavation. It appeared,
however, that the City had developed a practice of issuing a building permit
in three stages: excavation, foundation and superstructure. This created an
estoppel which the Court expressed as follows:
I do not think it appropriate for the city to now resist mandamus by saying to
the applicants ... you should have done something that was not the agreed and
accepted mode of procedure which was adopted and followed by the city and
by builders.'13

The City could not say that what it had always done was not proper. 82 It
might have been argued in the George Herczeg case that the City could not
128

[1975] 6 W.W.R. 345 (Alta. S.C.).

McDonald I. emphasized that the developer was not advised of the deficiencies
until after the mandamus proceedings had commenced.
ISO [1972] 2 O.R. 561, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 165 (H.C.).
129

131 Id. at 168 (D.L.R.) per Galligan J.
132

To the same effect is the unreported decision of Cowan CJ.T.D. in Re Gover-

nors of Dalhousie College & University (1974), upheld by the Nova Scotia Court of Ap-

peal (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 610, 9 N.S.R. (2d) 645. At trial his Lordship said at 24-26:
In my opinion, it would be unjust to permit the city now to take the stand that it
had not been supplied with detailed specifications and scale drawings, when it had
consciously and deliberately, and in accordance with practices followed for some
seven years, induced applicants such as the University to omit to file such specifications and scale drawings at the [preliminary] stage ....
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be bound by what had been done in other cases, properly or improperly, because that would be to prevent it from dealing with each case on its individual
merits. The developer was not relying on a purported exercise of power in
relation to his case. 1m This point was taken up by Dubinsky J. in Chater v.
City of Dartmouth, involving a similar fact situation. 34 He held that the
developer could not rely on an unlawful practice deliberately followed by
of some representation that the usual practice
the municipality in the absence 35
would be followed in his case.'
Finally, there is the decision in Re Smith and Municipality of Vanier,
already considered. 186 Pennell J. professed to be enforcing a requirement of
good faith in the exercise of statutory powers, and he did not use the language
of estoppel. Still, he could not order the municipality to issue a licence unless
he was satisfied that the municipality had exercised its discretion in the applicant's favour. By ordering mandamus, he was treating the municipality as
having made precisely that decision which its conduct in the matter gave the
appearance of having been made. Bad faith was an appropriate label under
which to tailor the administrative action of the municipality to its prior decisions. But it is estoppel that permits the court to find a decision in the conduct
of the public authority. In the much earlier case of Township of Pembroke v.
Canada Central Railway Co., the Ontario High Court used the principle for
that purpose. 37 A municipality whose council had passed resolutions requiring the railway company to fill up ditches and put down proper crossings later
took the position that it had not given its permission to construction of the
railway as required by statute. It was held that something "more than mere
acquiescence was involved, and in these circumstances the municipality was
to say that the consent required by the legislation had not been
not permitted
138
given.
What distinguishes Re Smith from Township of Pembroke and gives it
the appearance of being revolutionary is that the former case involves a restriction on the freedom of action of the municipality in exercising a statutory
138 See text accompanying and following note 56, supra.
134 (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 122, 20 N.S.R. (2d) 34 (T.D.).
135 The Dalhousie College case, supranote 132, was distinguished on the ground that

"there ... the city's officials by their discussions with the university gave the university
every reason to believe that as to the university, the usual practice was being followed."
Id. at 140 (D.L.R.) per Dubinsky I.
186 Supra note 86.

137 (1882), 3 O.R. 503 (M.C.).
Is8 Id. at 509-10. See also Queen Victoria Niagara Falls Park Comm'rs. v. International Ry Co., supra note 6. The Commissioners entered into an agreement permitting
the company to operate a railway within the park. For many years the railway sold souvenirs as part of its operation, and this was known to the Commissioners. The Ontario
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the Commissioners were estopped from
later taking the position that the sale of souvenirs was not authorized by the agreement.
Grant L.A. at 769 (D.L.R.) said, "In all this, not only was there no notice or warning
given by the plaintiffs to the defendants that the sale of souvenirs, etc., was objected to,
or would not be allowed to continue, but, on the contrary, I think it is a fair and just
inference to be drawn from the circumstances, that the defendants not only themselves
expected, but were expected by the plaintiffs, to continue the business of selling souvenirs ...

"
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power. It involves estoppel as well and seems, therefore, to violate the rule
that a public authority may not be estopped from exercising its statutory
power. But this view of the matter fails to recognize that Re Smith involves
not an exception to one established principle, but two established principles
working in combination. Those principles are, first, that an authority may be
estopped from saying that it has not made a particular decision, and, second,
that an authority may be bound to act in accordance with its previous decisions. 1 9 Taken together they do not mean that the authority is estopped from
exercising its power.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many questions still to be resolved. I would single out two as
being of particular importance.
In applying the principle that a government agency may be estopped
from pleading ultravires, is a line to be drawn somewhere on the basis of the
nature of the jurisdictional defect? In most of the cases I have examined here
the defect in question was minor, technical or procedural. 140 The agency had
power to do what it was taken to have done. 41 The North Western Gas
Board case is perhaps exceptional because the public authority wanted to say
that the applicable legislation simply did not authorize it to levy as rates the
amounts collected. There was no apparent way in which the authority might
have acquired jurisdiction by proceeding differently. The Canadian cases that
say a municipal corporation may be estopped from pleading ultra vires insist
that the action taken be within the "general competence" of the municipality. 142
It should not escape notice, however, that if estoppel is limited to cases in
which the public authority had power to do what was done improperly, then
the concept of estoppel is not really needed to ensure that public authorities
behave consistently. The decision or act which is described as ultra vires can
be characterized simply as a promise by the authority to implement by appro139 This assumes, of course, an authoritative power of decision and reliance on the
conduct of the public authority.
140 In at least two cases, Wells v. Min. of Hous. and Local Gov't, supra note 40,
and Scott v. City of Winnipeg, supra note 120, the departures from statute were characterized as irregularities only, that might be waived by the authority. In Lever (Finance)
Ltd. v. Westminster Corp., supra note 32, Sachs L.J. approved of Lord Denning's judgment in the Wells case only to the extent that it recognized a waiver of procedural irregularities, rendering valid that which would otherwise be invalid.
141 Evans, Delegation and Estoppel in Administrative Law, supra note 34, at 337,
notes that the scope of the principle applied by Lord Denning in Lever is not altogether
clear. It is not clear whe ther estoppel operated irrespective of any statutory power in the
corporation to delegate its functions to the planning officer. In Grevas v. The Queen
(1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 500, 23 W.W.R. 577, the Supreme Court of British Columbia
held that the Minister of Mines could not be estopped from saying that certificates of
work issued by his department were ineffective, because they were obtained without
proper compliance with the statute. Here, however, the statute expressly conferred power
on the Minister to take certain action upon receiving a complaint that certificates had
been improperly or wrongfully obtained.
142 See Rogers, 2 The Law of CanadianMunicipal Corporations,supra note 116, at
1003, and compare Tamieson v. City of Fredericton (1851), 7 N.B.R. 128 (S.C.) and
Rayonier B.C. Ltd. v. City of New Westminster (1961), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 446, 36 W.W.R.
433 (B.C.C.A.) with Township of Pembroke v. Canada CentralRy. Co., supra note 137.
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priate executive action its substantive determination of the question. It simply
does not matter that the act or decision is ultra vires on procedural grounds.
It is nonetheless a determination in the individual's favour and should require
implementation by proper executive action no less than the determinations in
cases such as Cutt v. City of Langley and Re Violi.1 43 There is good reason to
prefer this philosophic basis over estoppel. It has been suggested, quite properly
I think, that no effect should be given to an ultra vires act where there is some
third party adversely affected by it. 1 44 The private law right arising under the
doctrine of estoppel should not override the public law right arising under
the concept of jurisdiction. This conflict is avoided entirely if the ultra vires
act or decision is characterized as an exercise of power that must be implemented by the appropriate executive action. Clearly, this analytical device will
not accommodate cases in which the authority asserts substantive ultra vires
on the ground, for example, that it has erred on a question that is preliminary
or collateral to its jurisdiction. These are questions to which its authoritative
power of decision does not extend. In deciding whether the authority should
nonetheless be estopped from pleading ultra vires, I believe the question to
be answered is whether, in relation to questions of that sort, the government
agency stands in any different position from the agency having no authoritative power of decision at all.14 5 If estoppel is made generally applicable to
jurisdictional defects, it may not be essential even that the agency has purported to decide in the individual's favour the questions of law or fact upon
which the limits of its jurisdiction depend. The George Herczeg case applies
estoppel to unlawful practices deliberately followed.
The second question relates to the role played by detrimental reliance
as a necessary element in holding the government to its undertakings. In
Norfolk County Council v. Secretary of State, the court refused to hold that
the council was estopped by the action of its planning officer in mistakenly
issuing a development permit because the developer had suffered no detriment.146 In a Canadian case, it was held that an experienced developer could
not claim to have been misled by the representations of a planning director. 47
These cases suggest that reasonable reliance and consequent damage are
143 The case which comes closest to proceeding on this analytical basis is British Columbia Hop Co. v. District of Kent, supra note 78. The council had agreed to close a
road but it passed no bylaw for that purpose. Macdonald J. said at 175 (D.L.R.) that
"the powers of the municipality could have been exercised to effect the intention of the
parties," and he held that the intention should be implemented by the council of the
municipality.
144 Gould, Note (1971), 87 L.Q. Rev. 15 at 17-18.
145 There is this difference. In the absence of any authoritative power of decision
in a government agency, the court has original jurisdiction in relation to any questions
of law or fact arising under the statute. But where questions of law or fact are preliminary or collateral to the jurisdiction of any agency having authoritative power of decision,
the court has supervisory jurisdiction only and can make no original declaration of right.
The line, however, between original and supervisory jurisdiction is not distinct. See
Warren, The Declaratory .udgment: Reviewing Administrative Action (1966), 44 Can.
B. Rev. 610 at 631-41.
146

[19731 3 All E.R. 673, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1400.
Fairmeadow Developments Ltd., [1973] 3 O.R. 144, 36 D.L.R. (3d) 168

147 Re

(D.C.).
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essential elements. Yet de Smith notes that in the Liverpool Corporation
case, there was no detrimental reliance on the assurance that persons affected
would be heard before a decision was taken. 148 And in Re Smith and The
Queen, Berger J. did not find that the accused had relied to his detriment on
the promise that he would not be prosecuted.1 49 It is impossible to reconcile
the cases on the basis that detrimental reliance is required only where the
authority is to be estopped from pleading ultra vires. There are cases treating
reliance as essential where excess of jurisdiction is not pleaded, 160 and cases
treating reliance as unnecessary where it is.151

I have not answered these questions. It is hoped, however, that they will
not be obscured by the proposition that the Crown cannot be estopped. As
Mr. Justice Berger puts it, the ordinary man is entitled to expect that the
Crown will keep its word.

148 Supra note 4, at 91.
149 Supra note 85.
15
0 In Western Dominion Coal Mines v. The King, [1946] Ex. C.R. 387, [1946] 4
D.L.R. 270, the company claimed a subsidy on the basis that the Emergency Coal Production Board had induced it to believe that it had been found entitled to the subsidy provided for by Order in Council. The Exchequer Court held that the company could not
succeed on the ground of estoppel because the company had not changed its position by
reason of any statement or representation by or on behalf of the Crown. In both Re
Loblaws Ltd., supra note 63, and Re Multi-Malls Inc., supra note 73, the developers relied to their detriment on the assurances given.
151 In School Trustees of Brockville v. Town Council of Brockville, supra note 127,
there was no finding of detrimental reliance. Compare Scott v. City of Winnipeg, supra
note 120, at 93 per Dubuc J., in which the City was estopped from denying the validity of
its notice of expropriation because when the notice was given "the plaintiff's right to dispose of his land, or to do anything he pleased with it was gone."

